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Abstract 
 
The political participation of Christians in the Arab world highlights the difficulties in 
reconciling the principles of equality and full rights based on citizenship with 
maintaining the public role of the religion of the majority of the population - Islam.   
Christian strategies have focused upon both Arab and state nationalism as well as 
pursuing individual ambitions.   The political context of these efforts is also 
significant.  Firstly, Christians are not immune to the political environment in the 
region which has been characterised by a tradition of authoritarianism and limited 
political opportunities.   Secondly, the Islamic environment provides the framework 
for discussing the political role of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority states.   Christian 
political participation has also been shaped by the strategies pursued by the ruling 
regimes.   These are namely being treated as same/indistinct, the notion of ‘loyal’ 
citizens and the institutionalization of differences through quotas.   Yet irrespective of 
what strategy is employed, religious identity continues to be the crucial factor in 
determining the type of political participation accessed by Christians in the region, 
thus challenging the notion of national unity.  
 
 
Introduction 
If political participation whether in the shape of voting or holding office is perceived 
as a sign of national and political integration of a specific community within a state, 
then Christians in the Arab world would appear to be fully engaged in the political 
process throughout the region.   From champions of independence to Foreign 
Ministers, army generals to ideologues and government advisors to leaders of radical 
leftist groups, examples abound of Christian involvement in all aspects of societal and 
political life in the region.   Yet does a list of names, however long and illustrious, 
quell the oft-voiced concerns regarding the equality and political opportunity of non-
Muslims in Muslim-majority countries?   The growth of Arab nationalism from the 
late nineteenth century appeared to offer Christians a chance to partake in the struggle 
for independence as equal citizens beside Muslims.   This optimism faded with the 
failures of the post-colonial Arab governments.   Fears over Islamic views on the 
position of minorities increased with the rising Islamization experienced in the region, 
particularly from the 1970s onwards.   While Christians may still continue to be 
present in cabinets and parliaments in the Middle East today, there is a danger that 
both Christians and Muslims will start to perceive these individuals solely as ‘window 
dressing’ and masking a situation where Christians are unable to contribute to their 
own society without significant assistance from those in authority.   However, the 
difficulties facing Christians in gaining access to power cannot be seen in isolation 
from the general political situation in the region.  The Middle East political system 
has been characterised by authoritarian regimes with limited pluralism.   It is in this 
context that all individuals who wish to participate in politics must operate. 
   This paper will examine the various strategies used by Christians to achieve this 
objective.   For the purpose of this discussion, political participation will be taken as 
covering three main areas.   Firstly, it refers to electoral representation where 
individuals are nominated, receive votes and gain seats in parliamentary and local 
elections.   Secondly, it includes presence in ministerial cabinets (usually picked by 
the head of state and/or Prime Minister) where more decision-making takes place.  
Lastly, it relates to the involvement of ordinary citizens in the political process 
through voting in various levels of elections.   As citizens, Christians like Muslims 
would expect to participate freely in all three categories.   The factors which hinder 
participation of any individual will be examined, followed by further constraints 
experienced by Christians due to the Islamic environment prevalent in most countries 
in the Arab world.   The paper will then provide an overview of the different methods 
of political participation practised by Christians in the Middle East, namely through 
the use of nationalism whether pan-Arab or state-centric.   Regime responses to these 
efforts have varied and will be analysed with reference to the following categories – 
same/indistinct citizens, ‘loyal’ citizens and citizens with differences institutionalised.   
Case studies will be taken from several countries but will be limited to those in the 
Arab Middle East with indigenous Christian populations.   In examining the political 
participation of Christians, the paper will highlight the tension between the rhetoric of 
equality and national unity and the reality of Christian political participation, 
suggesting that difference based on religious identity is reinforced through regime 
strategies. 
 
Background to the Christian Presence and Identity in the Middle East 
The Middle East is the birthplace of the three monotheistic faiths – Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam.   While Muslims are by far the majority of the population in 
the region, Jewish and Christian communities are still present.   Initially, the early 
Christian church was persecuted under the Roman Empire but this changed once it 
became the official state religion in the fourth century.   Theological disputes hindered 
the unity of the church leading to the establishment of various denominations.   
Resistance to the creed imposed by the Byzantine authorities was strongest on the 
periphery of the empire such as Egypt and Syria (Maila 1998:31).   The dominant 
group in each area whether Orthodox or another denomination aimed to consolidate 
their position by attacking believers of other branches of the Christian church.   It was 
during this period of turmoil and disunity that the third monotheistic faith – Islam – 
was established in Arabia and the followers of Prophet Mohammed under his 
successors were able to conquer the entire region by the early seventh century.   The 
Arab conquest drastically changed the environment for the Christian population in the 
Middle East.   While some groups had been subject to Byzantine military campaigns 
against them, the new rulers no longer shared the same faith as their subjects.   The 
people in the newly conquered lands were given three choices by the incoming 
Muslim forces.   They could convert to this new religion, pay a monetary tribute 
(jizya) in exchange for freedom to worship and internal autonomy or continue to fight 
(Courbage and Fargues 1994:2).   Gradually, the Christians became a minority in the 
Islamic empire.   The Muslim authorities favoured a communalistic approach rather 
than negotiating with individuals.   As religious identity was the distinguishing feature 
of the Christians, the religious leader was seen as the head of the community and 
given internal autonomy over the group while accepting responsibility for their 
actions.    Under the Ottomans, this became institutionalised as the millet system.   In 
the nineteenth century, the number of recognised denominations increased as some 
Christians were receptive to Catholic and Protestant missionary efforts.   In the case 
of the Catholic churches, communities had been established much earlier but were 
unable to obtain official recognition (Maila 1998:36-37). 
   The Christians in the Middle East cannot be regarded as a monolithic group.   They 
are found in several countries in the region, belong to different denominations and 
often have multiple identities.   In terms of ethnic identity, many would classify 
themselves as Arab.   Members of the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Protestant 
churches in particular have historically been active in parties and organisations which 
stress belonging to the Arab nation as the predominant component of their identity.   
However, others have connected their distinct religious identity to a separate ethnic 
group.   The Armenians are the clearest example of this.   Their communal history and 
heritage as a Christian nation has been maintained throughout the centuries amongst 
the diaspora.   The survivors of the 1915 massacres and forced marches settled in 
Arab lands (primarily Syria and Lebanon) and added to the existing Armenian 
communities there (Migliorino 2008).   Their desire to preserve their identity through 
the use of the Armenian language and encouraging marriage from within the 
community means that to a certain extent they can be categorised as a closed 
community.   However, by having no separatist interests within the region, their 
different ethnic identity is not perceived as a threat by any government in the states 
where they are located.   It appears that their distinct identity can be acknowledged 
and respected by state authorities because it is fully compatible with their status as 
loyal citizens to the countries where they reside.   The Assyrians have been less 
successful in gaining recognition of their claims of a separate ethnicity.   Again, a 
separate language, church and heritage were used to distinguish the community from 
its Arab neighbours.   A failed attempt to create an Assyrian homeland as part of the 
post-World War One Western division of the Ottoman Empire led to the killings of 
1933.   Under the independent state of Iraq, religious but not ethnic differences were 
tolerated and the Assyrians were categorised as Arab Christians alongside other 
denominations.  In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Assyrians have commenced reasserting 
their ethnic identity albeit cautiously given the political, religious and ethnic divisions 
which have attributed to the violence which afflicts the country (Healey 2010).    
   Other churches which have a distinct liturgical language e.g. Aramaic, Syriac or 
Coptic have also offered an opportunity for those who wish to develop an identity 
separate from the dominant Arab one.   For example, there were attempts within the 
Maronite community in the late nineteenth century to pursue an ‘ethnic’ identity by 
claiming ancestry from the Phoenicians (ancient traders off the Lebanese coast) as 
well as stressing the development of the community in its homeland of Mount 
Lebanon (Kanaan 2005:51; Kaufmann 2004).   Similarly, the same period witnessed 
claims from some Copts that they were the true Egyptians descended from the 
Pharaohs (Watson 2000:7).   In the Maronite case, the links between the modern 
Maronites and Phoenicians appear rather dubious and in both cases, critics have 
argued that these ties are equally applicable to Muslims in these territories due to 
conversions to Islam from the time of the Arab conquest (Salibi 1988:179; Watson 
2000:7).   While the ‘ethnic’ element of these communities is in doubt, there is 
certainly a deep connection between the Maronite and Coptic churches and their 
respective homelands – Lebanon and Egypt and this has allowed them to contribute to 
the nationalist discourse in both countries.   In summary, the plurality of Christian 
identity in the Middle East is demonstrated by the fact that while some correspond 
directly with an ethnic group whether the dominant Arab or a minority group and 
others overlap with specific states, these two categories are not necessarily 
incompatible.  
 
Political Environment and Constraints 
The political participation of Christians in the Middle East must be examined in the 
context of the tradition of authoritarianism which is prevalent in the region.   The 
identity of the leaders has rarely changed beyond the ruling family during the lifespan 
of younger generations regardless of a republican or monarchical state structure.   The 
protests which erupted in 2011 led to the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak of Egypt who had been in power since 1981.   Similarly in Syria, the long 
rule of the Asad family is under threat.   Hafez al-Asad was president from 1971 until 
his death in 2000 when he was succeeded by his son Bashar.   In the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, most Jordanians have witnessed the reign of two kings - King 
Hussein (1952-1999) and his son King Abdullah II.   While this entrenchment of 
power is now being challenged, it is apparent that regimes have used a variety of 
measures to attempt to retain influence.   Constitutional arrangements ensure that 
power is concentrated in the executive including notably the command of the military 
and security services.   Legislative authority is further constrained by adapting 
electoral laws which dilute the impact of opponents, tight restrictions concerning the 
formation of political parties, crackdowns on the opposition during electoral 
campaigns and in some cases, interference on election day including preventing voters 
from entering polling stations and falsifying votes (Pripstein Posusney 2005:91-92).   
The weakness of civil society and opposition parties which are often beset with 
fragmentation, internal infighting and financial difficulties has also detracted from 
offering alternatives to the existing regimes.   While the 1990s onwards saw a move 
towards regular parliamentary elections and in the case of Egypt, the first presidential 
elections in 2005, these were not considered as indicators of democratization in the 
region.   In the Egyptian example, the leading opposition candidate Ayman Nour 
polled only 8% of votes compared to Mubarak’s 88.5% although it is revealing that 
only 23% of the Egyptian electorate actually opted to participate in the election.  Nour 
later found himself arrested and imprisoned for five years over apparent campaigning 
irregularities (Shahin 2010:106).   In Jordan, parliamentary elections were reinstated 
in1989 but the regime was integral in shaping electoral mechanisms such as electoral 
laws and the size of districts as well as dissolving parliament (2001-2003 and 2009-
2010) according to its own interests (Hamid 2010).   Such measures demonstrate the 
difficulties associated with challenging the status quo in the region.   As Brown and 
Shahin note regarding so-called reforms, ‘All are top-down efforts undertaken to 
enhance the grip of faltering authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes on power’ 
(2010:4).   It was not until the 2011 protests that this combination of co-option and 
repression was significantly challenged by popular uprisings.    
   Since independence, the Arab states have struggled to make an impression on the 
multiple challenges facing the region.    Domestically, various factors such as socio-
economic inequality, poverty, unemployment, corruption and lack of investment in 
education, health and social services all hinder the quality of life experienced by many 
citizens as detailed in successive United Nations Development Programme reports on 
Arab Human Development (UNDP 2009).   These problems are exacerbated by the 
implications of a population explosion which was estimated in 1980 to be around 150 
million region-wide but by 2007 had reached 317 million (UNDP 2009).   
Furthermore, there is a significant ‘youth bulge’ in the Arab world with 60% of the 
population estimated to be under the age of 25.   In these circumstances, most 
governments would struggle to dramatically improve the situation but arguably, this 
places the authoritarian non-oil wealthy Arab regimes in a dilemma.   They are unable 
to placate their populations by ‘buying’ their acquiescence through providing material 
goods and instead, have been forced to offer political opening as compensation as 
occurred in Jordan and Algeria in the late 1980s.   Most top-down ‘reform’ initiatives 
can be traced back to either economic difficulties or external (usually Western) 
pressure.   The events of 2011 would suggest that such measures have not been 
uniformly successful given the intertwining of economic and political factors such as 
wealth inequality and corruption which started the initial uprising in Tunisia and then 
spread to neighbouring countries.   Regionally, instability and insecurity remain key 
concerns for both regimes and their citizens.   The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has now 
been joined by the situation in Iraq as a key grievance in the Arab world.   The failure 
of Arab regimes to successfully resolve these issues whether through peaceful or 
military means adversely affects their legitimacy.   Combined with the Palestinian 
refugee issue and the regional role of Iran, all of these factors shape the prospects of 
regional stability which also has a direct impact on the economic and political 
outlook.   Migration from the Arab world is also a common trend.   While Lebanon is 
one of the few Arab states not categorised as authoritarian, unfortunately its regular 
experiences of unrest connected to both domestic and regional issues means that it 
still suffers from many of the conditions above.   Consequently, it would be accurate 
to say that these factors are not conducive to encouraging political participation.   
Such activities can be seen as pointless when it is perceived that the same elite remain 
in power, difficulties are rarely tackled and security is not guaranteed.   Even given 
the change of governments in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, it is not yet apparent that the 
old elite have fully lost their influence.   Therefore, when examining Christian 
political participation in the region, one must be aware of this context which affects 
all of the population regardless of religious identity. 
   However, the Islamic environment also adds additional complications for political 
participation by non-Muslims or Muslim minorities.   In the Arab world, religion has 
in general retained social significance and therefore continues to influence political 
affairs.   In the majority of Arab countries, the role of Islam is recognised in the 
constitution as the official state religion and sharia is often acknowledged as a source 
of legislation – to what extent is dependent on each country.   The political role of 
Christians has long been dependent upon interpretations of Prophet Mohammed and 
subsequent caliphs’ perspectives on the position of non-Muslims.   Historically, 
Christians and Jews were categorised by the Muslim conquerors in the seventh 
century as ahl al-kitab (people of the book) and as such were given the options of 
converting to Islam, retaining their original faith or continuing to fight.   Those who 
remained Christian or Jewish were free to practice their own religion, had internal 
autonomy and enjoyed external protection from the Muslim armies in exchange for 
acknowledging Islamic rule and the payment of taxes known as the jizya.   These 
treaties led to non-Muslims being known as dhimmi (covenanted people) (Scott 
2010:16).   Throughout the various Islamic empires, individual non-Muslims were 
able to advance in specific professions such as medicine, administration and 
scholarship.   However, they were subject to discrimination including periodic spells 
when popular Muslim discontent at their position at court would lead to a backlash 
against them (Griffith 2005:232-236). 
   In contemporary Islamic thought, this dilemma has still not been resolved.   The 
right of non-Muslims to worship is generally respected and individuals are able to 
participate in the state and society.  However, it is usually accepted that certain 
positions are off-limits such as head of state or commander of the army.   One 
function of these roles is to lead Muslims in both temporal and spiritual activity – a 
role which it is perceived cannot be undertaken by non-Muslims.   In some cases, 
there may be a written restriction e.g. Syria whereas in others, it is seen as a matter of 
convention.   Lebanon is the exception to this case as its process of nationbuilding 
allowed Christians to play an integral role in the state to the extent that it is 
guaranteed that the president should belong to the Maronite Christian community. 
   Even within the contemporary political Islam current, the extent of participation of 
non-Muslims is contested.   The debate within Islamist circles in Egypt exposes the 
different perspectives available.   While it is mostly accepted that Coptic Christians 
are citizens, it is disputed to what extent this corresponds to equality (Scott 2010:122).   
Moving on from statements made in 1997 by the then spiritual guide Mustafa 
Mashhur that Copts should be excluded from military service and pay jizya as a 
symbol of their position as dhimmi, the deputy spiritual guide Mohammed Habib 
affirmed almost ten years later that ‘We consider our Coptic brothers as citizens 
enjoying all the rights associated with citizenship…. We consider them as partners…. 
The basis for filling public posts shall be efficiency, ability and experience, not 
religion or beliefs’ (Browers 2009:66; Harnisch and Mecham 2009:199).   Yet, the 
tension over the issue of non-Muslim guardianship over Muslims which is viewed as 
prohibited under sharia ensured that their 2007 draft platform still excluded Christians 
from attaining the office of presidency (Harnisch and Mecham 2009:199).   Following 
the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood has been recognised 
as the Freedom and Justice Party which is open to non-Muslims as part of the political 
party regulations. (The Daily Star 2011).   The wasatiyya (moderate/centrist) trend has 
attempted to bridge this gap between Islamic teaching and the need for full citizenship 
for non-Muslims by promoting a civilization approach.   By focusing upon the 
historical contributions of Christians to Islamic civilization, this pluralist concept of 
the umma can ‘refer to a broader cultural community that includes Egypt’s Coptic 
Christians’ (Wickham 2004:209).   According to Rafiq Habib a Coptic Protestant 
intellectual associated with the al-Wasat party, the concept of Islam as a civilization 
‘encompasses full civic equality for all members of the umma, as citizens of state, 
regardless of faith’ (Browers 2009:68).   Furthermore, some Islamist intellectuals 
have argued that Copts have participated in historical struggles in Egypt and therefore 
should be perceived as shuraka (co-partners) rather than merely muwatinun (citizens) 
(Browers 2009:68).   Yet, these ideas have failed to garner widespread support among 
Islamists, the wider Muslim community or indeed Egyptian Christians.   Regarding 
this idea of a shared civilization, Hatina notes that ‘Copts viewed it as blurring their 
distinctive legacy, and Islamists viewed it as detracting from Islam’s key role in 
shaping society and its superiority over other cultures’ (Hatina 2006 :49).   This 
ongoing deliberation in Egypt over the political role of non-Muslims highlights the 
difficulties faced by Christians throughout the Arab world in their attempts to 
overcome restrictions placed on their activities by Islamic teaching and practice.   
 
Individual Participation 
Given the constraints imposed by a religious oriented environment, it is no surprise 
that Christians eagerly contributed to an ideological movement which promised 
participation based on belonging to an Arab nation rather than a particular religion.   
Christians played a pioneering role in the nahda the mid-nineteenth century literary 
revival which centred upon Greater Syria.   Scholars such as Butros al-Bustani, Nasif 
al-Yaziji and Khalil al-Khuri contributed to the idea that the Arab nation was founded 
upon a shared language, culture and history.  Similar to the current wasatiyya 
civilizational approach, it was argued that as Christians could identify with this in the 
same way as Muslims, they were automatically members of this Arab nation (Jandora 
1984:73).   Through their involvement in education, literary societies and journals, 
they were able to help spread these ideas throughout the Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth.   For example in 
Palestine, Christian journalists were at the forefront of warning the population about 
the dangers of Zionism and stressed the need for an Arab state through newspapers 
such as al-Karmil (Najib Nassar) and Filastin (Isa al-Isa and Yusuf al-Isa) (Shomali 
1995:228-229).   Increasing calls for decentralization within the Ottoman Empire led 
to the politicization of the Arab nationalist movement which intensified as a 
consequence of the 1908 Young Turks Revolution and the ensuing Turkification 
process leading to the 1916 Arab Revolt.   During this transformation, the place of 
Islam within the Arab nationalist ideology became prominent.   Browers suggests that 
Arab nationalism in the Maghreb where there were few Christians had always 
perceived Islam as being a central component whereas in the Mashreq, there was a 
more secular tendency within early Arab nationalism (Browers 2009:21).   While 
Christians may have perceived ethnicity as being the main element, for many 
Muslims, Islam could not be separated from Arabism due to its impact on the history 
of the region and the place of Arabic as the language of the Qur’an.   In order to 
become a populist ideology, Christians had to accept an expansion of the Islamic 
element and according to Salibi, at least acknowledge the historical role of 
Muhammad as the founder and leader of both the Arab nation and Islamic civilization 
(Salibi 1988:48).   While Christians were clearly a minority within this populist 
movement, some individuals were still able to attain prominent positions.         
   In Egypt, Makram Ebeid Pasha was an influential member of the Wafd party which 
struggled to gain independence from Britain in the 1919 revolution and then became a 
major actor in Egyptian politics.   Renowned for his legal skills, oration and 
knowledge of foreign languages, Makram Ebeid was clearly an asset to the 
burgeoning nationalist party.   His involvement in anti-British activities which led to 
his imprisonment and exile also meant that he was perceived as a loyal nationalist.   
Makram Ebeid was elected to a predominantly Muslim district of Cairo and held 
influential positions including Minister of Finance.   Similar to other notable Coptic 
Wafd members, he believed that both Copts and Muslims should unite to attain 
independence and that this joint struggle guaranteed Copts an equal place in the new 
Egypt.   Therefore, he strongly rejected the idea of parliamentary quotas or 
classification as a minority group dismissing such measures as British attempts to 
divide and rule.   Throughout his political career, he continually reiterated the bonds 
between Egypt, its citizens and its religious heritage such as ‘I am a Christian, it is 
true by religion, but through my country, I am a Muslim’ (Nisan 1991:122).   Yet, the 
Wafd party failed to satisfy Coptic expectations of equality particularly by the mid-
1930s.   Makram Ebeid’s inability to progress beyond the deputy position to become 
party secretary or Prime Minister was one of the factors which led to his decision to 
establish a splinter party al-Kutla al-Wafdiyya (Makari 2007:52).   While he remains a 
powerful symbol of Egyptian national unity, his failure to attain the eminent political 
positions demonstrates the shortcomings of the nationalist approach where religious 
identity still impacts on the extent of political participation available. 
   Similarly, Syria presents another example of a prominent Christian activist who was 
instrumental in the Arab nationalist struggle – this time as a formulator of the 
ideology.   Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox schoolteacher co-founded the Arab Ba’th 
Socialist Party in the early 1940s together with a Sunni colleague Salah an-Din Bitar.   
Their vision of an Arab nation was one where the contribution of Islam was in the 
cultural not religious sphere (van Dam 1996:33).   Aflaq comprehended Muhammad 
as the founder of the Arab nation and Islam as a response to Arab needs at a particular 
time in history (Haim 1976:62).   Therefore, the key tenets were captured in the party 
slogan ‘wahda, hurriyah, ishtirahkiyah’ (Unity, Freedom, Socialism) (Hinnebusch 
2001:31).   The influence of these ideas was momentous given that the Ba’th party 
became the ruling party in Syria (1963-present) and Iraq (1968-2003).   However, the 
movement was also plagued by internal splits between regionalists and nationalists, 
military and civilian wings.   Ba’thist rule did not necessarily correspond to the ideals 
of its founders and Aflaq also became a victim of internal disunity and relocated to 
Iraq.   Again, Aflaq’s example demonstrates that Christians were able to participate in 
the initial period of the Arab nationalist movement but then struggled to retain their 
prominence. 
   The Arab nationalist approach as a strategy for Christian political participation was 
also compromised by the wider failings of the movement to deliver its post-
independence promises of political participation, economic development, Arab unity 
and the liberation of Palestine.   Instead, it became associated with authoritarianism, 
corruption, wealth inequality, regional rivalries and military failures.   These factors 
were significant in the rise of political Islam as an alternative to the so-called secular 
Arab nationalist strategy particularly after the 1967 Arab defeat to Israel.   In this new 
environment, Christians tended to pursue two options.   Those who were perceived as 
politicised tended to be amenable to radical leftist parties which still pursued a secular 
nationalist approach.   For example, George Habash established the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1967 and a further splinter group the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was led by Nayef 
Hawatmeh.   Both espoused the use of armed struggle in order to attain their goal of 
an independent Palestinian state (Aburish 1993:13).   The other option was to 
exchange traditional Arab nationalism for state nationalism which required 
individuals to prove their loyalty to the ruling regimes and leaders.   Individuals from 
elite families can regularly be found in prominent political positions such as the 
Boutros Ghalis in Egypt and the Abu Jabers and Muashers in Jordan.   In the 
Lebanese case, Christians were also widely involved in the nationalist movement 
although this was focused more on disputes within Lebanese Christian nationalism 
over the raison d’être of Lebanon i.e. as a refuge for Christians or a homeland for all 
(Kanaan 2005:126-7).   The failure to develop a national identity which included all 
Lebanese confessions meant that this strategy also failed and was partly responsible 
for the devastating civil war (1975-1990) which diminished Christian (especially 
Maronite) political predominance in Lebanon.  Yet even in this system, notable 
families such as the Gemayels and Chamouns were also able to have a lasting 
presence within the system.   In conclusion, individual Christians have clearly been 
able to contribute to nationalist movements whether pan-Arab or state-oriented but the 
legitimacy problems facing such movements and governments have led either to 
participants being tainted by their connections to the regime or becoming involved in 
more radical movements.   Neither approach has proved to be one which has 
encouraged a significant proportion of the Christian communities in the region to 
follow suit.   Furthermore, concerns at the limitations imposed on Christians by the 
increased public role of Islam in the region have also affected Christians’ views on 
political participation.  
         
Regime Policies Towards Christian Political Participation 
The type and extent of Christian political participation is also interconnected to the 
policies practiced by each state and in particular, if distinctive strategies are employed 
with regard to Christians in comparison to other citizens.   The first approach 
perceives Christians as the same/indistinct from the rest of the population in terms of 
their rights and responsibilities to hold office, stand as candidates and join in political 
life,   In other words, it is possible to attain positions on the basis of competence and 
political views rather than religious identity.   There is a direct correlation between 
this approach and states which publicly portray themselves as ‘secular’.   When 
surveying the Syrian example, it is apparent that the ‘Alawi dominated regime sought 
to minimise religious identity within the political arena.   Appealing to an inclusive 
version of Arab nationalism based on a shared heritage and language, would allow 
individuals from minority groups to participate as Syrians rather than any other sub-
national identity.   This was attained through the vehicle of the Ba’th party.   Indeed, 
President Bashar al-Asad publicly declared that this interpretation of Arabism was a 
means to incorporate all.   ‘Arab nationalism is not an ethnicity, it is a cultural feature’ 
(al-Safir 2009).   Therefore, under his own presidency and that of his father, 
Christians have continued to contribute to the political life of the country and can be 
found in the cabinet, national assembly, Ba’th party and public administration.   In a 
different vein, a small number of Christians can also be found amongst the opposition 
with individuals such as Michel Kilo and Anwar al-Bunni being imprisoned regularly.   
In these cases, opponents are targeted due to their attitude towards the party and 
regime rather than their religious identity.    
   Yet, even in this so-called secular system, Christian identity is not totally ignored.   
While Christians serve as cabinet ministers and high-ranking army officers, it is 
assumed amongst all Syrian society that it would not be appropriate for a Christian to 
be the head of state.   Indeed, Article Three of the constitution declares that the 
religion of the president must be Islam (International Constitutional Law 2010).   
Furthermore, there may not be official quotas for the amount of Christians involved in 
national institutions but regardless, the regime ensures that Christians are nominated 
to the Ba’th list in regions with a considerable Christian population.   Similarly, the 
cabinet will always have at least one Christian minister.   While individuals selected 
will be known for their political loyalty and competence, it is clear that their religious 
identity is also significant.   These actors are not necessarily expected to represent 
their respective churches or indeed communities but instead present a visual 
illustration of the incorporation of different groups within the political system under 
the banner of Ba’athism.   The regime is blatantly aware of Christians’ apprehension 
for their role in society if a change of government took place in Syria.  This has 
become more pronounced as a consequence of the protests which erupted in Syria in 
mid-2011.   Until this point, the suppression of the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood-led 
revolt and the rise of sectarian violence in post-Ba’thist Iraq were utilised to 
demonstrate the shared interests of the regime and minorities in Syria.   Now, the 
dangers of sectarian splits appear closer to home.   It is far too simplistic to label this 
as a case of ‘minorities sticking together’ but clearly the Ba’thist regime does not 
perceive its Christian citizens as presenting a significant threat and instead has 
identified their support as useful but not vital.   This favourable policy may also be 
connected to the size of the Christian community in Syria which is estimated to be 
just below two million, around 8% of the population.   Similarly, Syrian Christians are 
conscious that governmental acceptance of their right to political participation as 
Syrian citizens allows them to generally operate within the same parameters as any 
other Syrian, albeit given the concentration of power in the presidency, these are 
rather limited.   It is noticeable that the Christian community as a whole has been 
rather silent concerning the unrest taking place in Syria in 2011.   The general 
experience in Syria has contributed to perceptions amongst Christians that Syria is a 
leading example in the Arab world with regard to their integration into political and 
societal life but they also implicitly recognise that there are a few extra constraints 
particularly related to access to high office.   To summarise, the Syrian Ba’thist 
version of secularism has enabled Christians to choose to participate in political life 
yet at the same time, this is not without some recognition of their religious identity 
which both assists and hinders them in their political aspirations. 
   The second approach emphasises that Christians are part of the nation and on the 
basis of being ‘loyal citizens’ have the right to participate in the political affairs of a 
country.   Countries which have a mixed secular and Muslim heritage within the 
political and legal systems are likely to support Christian participation but justify this 
in terms of Christians having secured this right through their patriotism in the past.   
In contrast to the first category, they are now defined by their religious identity.   
While individual Christians can be elected or picked to high positions depending on 
their personal qualities, one overt objective is to ensure Christian presence in the 
political system.   As has been seen in the case of Egypt, the involvement of Coptic 
Christians in the nationalist movement against the British meant that they were 
offered and accepted the right to participate in the political system of the independent 
state as equals and rejected any special provisions for Coptic representation.   
However, under the republican regime since 1952, Copts have struggled to be elected 
to parliament and apart from occasional exceptions, rarely attain other highly ranked 
state positions.   In the 2000 parliamentary elections three Copts were elected 
followed by only one in 2005 - the Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghali who 
depended on the considerable backing of the National Democratic Party, the ruling 
party (Shehata 2008:116).   Consequently, it became traditional for the president to 
use some of his ten nominations to the parliament to supplement Coptic 
representation.   Similarly, the cabinet will usually include two Coptic ministers.   
This low level of representation is contrasted with the size of the Coptic community 
which although disputed numbers at least five million, around 5-6% of the population.    
   In general, the Egyptian political elite do not acknowledge that the political reality 
has not lived up to the ideals of equal participation regardless of religious identity 
which was espoused by the early twentieth century Egyptian nationalist movement.   
Coptic grievances regarding their under-representation in political life, church 
building legislation and violent communal incidents are not directly addressed.   
Instead, whenever these issues are raised, the national unity discourse becomes 
prevalent which affirms that Copts and Muslims make up the Egyptian nation and 
stresses historical events such as co-operation during the 1919 revolution (McCallum 
2010:98-106).   For example, President Hosni Mubarak frequently remarked on this 
unity in public speeches, ‘There is no difference between us at all.   We are all 
Egyptians’ (al Jazeera 2005).   While such responses clearly demonstrate that Copts 
are to be accepted as part of the Egyptian nation, it can also be interpreted as an 
indication of opposition to this idea as if it was accepted by all Egyptians, it would not 
be necessary to have to constantly repeat such sentiments.   Thus, these statements do 
not offer a proactive solution to the underlying causes of communal tension.   This is 
partly because the Mubarak regime was unwilling to risk upsetting the delicate 
balancing act of allowing a gradual Islamization of society and subsequent political 
demands while still retaining secular principles which regard all Egyptians as equal.   
The Egyptian constitution reflects this ambiguity of secular and religious heritage as 
Article Two proclaims that Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source 
of legislation while Article Forty states that there is no difference between citizens 
based upon religious (or other) identities.   This apparent contradiction and the refusal 
of the government to address it can be connected to the primary goal of stability.   
These are contributory factors to the growing Coptic withdrawal from the Egyptian 
national political system.    
   There is a general consensus within the Coptic community that it is futile to attempt 
to work within this system.   Coptic politicians are not perceived as prioritising 
campaigns on concerns raised by the community such as communal violence, 
discriminatory legislation and the implications of an increasingly Islamic public 
sphere.   Instead, they are frequently dismissed as Christians in name only who have 
little interest in the actual community.   As they are often connected to the ruling elite 
and several come from the traditional Coptic elite families, it is assumed that they will 
be beholden only to those who propelled them to these positions.   Dissatisfaction 
with this type of representation has allowed the religious leadership of the community 
through the dominant Coptic Orthodox Church to establish its own credentials as 
spokesman and liaison between the government and the community (McCallum 
2010:123-158).   These are the challenges faced by the post-Mubarak rulers of Egypt 
(currently the army).   While some Copts were actively involved in the 2011 protests 
and perceived the campaign for democracy as a means of readdressing citizenship 
issues, the continuance of communal violence suggests that the underlying issues 
relating to equality still need to be resolved.   Therefore, the Egyptian case study 
highlights that the ‘loyal citizen’ strategy is supportive of Christian political 
participation but with the understanding that preserving stability will always be 
prioritised over resolving the dilemma between national and religious identity.   For 
Christians, this approach does not appear to deliver the conditions required for their 
full and equal political participation.   Instead, any involvement in national affairs has 
to be embarked upon under the same rules for all Egyptians while simultaneously, it is 
acknowledged that they are different from the majority, thus casting doubt on whether 
they can be treated equally in these circumstances.  
   The third strategy recognises the differences between citizens by institutionalising 
these through the political system.   This is usually attained through the use of quotas 
for minority groups to ensure their representation in parliament.   This system is more 
likely to take place in countries where the Christian community is numerically 
marginal both in terms of actual numbers and percentage of the overall population.   It 
is argued that without quotas, they would struggle to attain representation.   In some 
cases, such an approach may also be prevalent in states where Islam is ascribed a 
significant place in the political system.   Jordan, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority all 
offer illustrations of this policy.   The starting point would appear to be that the 
governing elite wish to safeguard minority representation within parliament and 
believe that this must be guaranteed through a quota system.   Christians as a religious 
minority are deemed eligible for this assistance.   In Jordan, Christians are allocated 
nine parliamentary seats along with three Circassian/Chechen seats and twelve seats 
reserved for women.   In 2010, one of these seats was won by a Christian bringing the 
total Christian representation in parliament to ten (Jordan Times 2010).   Similarly in 
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Christians have been assigned five out of the eight seats 
for minorities while a 25% quota for female parliamentarians has also been introduced 
(POGAR: 2010).   Finally, since the first elections held in 1996, the Palestinian 
Authority parliamentary electoral law has included six guaranteed Christian seats and 
one Samaritan seat in areas where these groups are numerous (Central Elections 
Commission Palestine n.d.) 
   In these examples, Christians have not been singled out and instead, the quota 
approach is justified by the state authorities as a means to ensure representation of 
groups within society who would otherwise be marginalised either due to their small 
numbers or societal traditions.   It would appear that there is an underlying 
assumption that without this assistance, the Arab Muslim majority would be unlikely 
to elect these marginal groups whether their distinction is due to religious identity, 
ethnicity or gender.   Some influential individuals would possibly succeed but in 
institutionalising representation, a set amount is guaranteed.   In determining how 
these seats are divided, the Jordanian electoral law divides the country into regional-
based constituencies and the Christian seats are located within regions with a 
significant Christian population.   While ensuring nine Christian parliamentarians, in 
another way, the law theoretically restricts representation.   If the second-placed 
Christian candidate was to poll more than the last candidate to win the Muslim seats, 
this individual would still not be elected (unless eligible to win through the women’s 
quota).   However, the Jordanian system allows the over-representation of Christians 
in parliament since they are given 7.5% of seats while estimates suggest that they are 
no more than 4% of the population (Jordan Times 2010).   The 2009 Iraqi electoral 
law amendment meant that Iraq adopted a similar path as Jordan by introducing 
quotas for women and compensatory seats for minorities.   As the Christians make up 
the largest of these minorities, they are guaranteed five seats.   This contrasts with the 
previous election in 2006 when only one Christian candidate was successful through a 
compensatory seat.   However, Iraq diverges from Jordan in the sense that the Iraqi 
parliament is much larger and therefore, in terms of percentage of seats, they have 
only 0.2% compared to their estimated population of 3% (al Jazeera 2010).   In the 
Palestinian Territories, the quota system was incorporated into the Basic Law 
(constitution) of the Palestinian Authority and includes six Christian seats in areas 
with a significant Christian population.   Christians are still able to stand through the 
normal process and some prominent individuals have been successful through this 
approach notably the academic and politician Hanan Ashrawi.   Such 
accomplishments prove that it is possible for Christians to win parliamentary seats 
without additional help but it would perhaps be difficult to regularly find candidates 
with this public recognition.   Hence, the legislation serves as a guarantee of securing 
Christian representation within parliament.  
   As has been demonstrated in previous sections, political participation is not solely 
confined to representation within parliament.   Given the lack of power and influence 
of most parliaments in the Arab world, the ability to participate in political life 
beyond these institutions is important if a group is to have any sway over decisions.   
In Jordan, cabinets usually include two ministers and Christians can also be found as 
palace advisers, in senior ranks of the military and in high positions within public 
administration.   Within the Palestinian Authority, individual Christians have been 
prominent as presidential advisers and within government ministries.   In Iraq, one 
Christian was appointed to the thirty-two strong cabinet in 2005.       
   In institutionalising the differences between the Muslim majority and a Christian 
minority, this quota approach highlights the significant role of Islam in the political 
system.   All three case studies acknowledge Islam as the official state religion and 
sharia as a source of legislation.   They also include references to equality before the 
law and freedom of worship but once more, the contradiction is clear.   Indeed, Iraqi 
Christians contested the drafting of the constitution in 2005 over its reference to the 
Islamic identity of Iraq (Yacoub 2008: 93-94).   This perception of Islam as the 
common factor which binds the nation together would appear to be more pronounced 
than in Syria and Egypt.   This can partly be attributed to the small size of the 
communities with around 240,000 (4%) in Jordan, 7-800,000 (3%) in Iraq and 50,000 
(2%) in the West Bank.   The quota system can also be interpreted as conveying to the 
communities that the regimes are not willing to leave their representation to chance 
but instead have chosen to guarantee their political presence.   In the Iraqi case, 
internal commitment to this policy can be questioned given the debates surrounding 
minority seats in provincial and national elections and the current system can certainly 
be traced to the circumstances surrounding the post-Ba’thist nationbuilding project.   
However, given that the three main groups in Iraq (Shia, Sunnis and Kurds) are 
struggling to divide power, it is not surprising that the political participation of small 
minorities such as Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks and Mandaeans are not regarded as a 
priority by the political elite.   In contrast, the Jordanian and Palestinian elites have 
clearly stated their desire to ensure representation of their pluralist societies.  In 
affirming the contribution of Christians to the nation, the differences may be 
institutionalised but the national attachment of the community is acknowledged.     
   Furthermore, the quota approach has the potential to allow access to the political 
arena to candidates supported by the community.   In general, these figures still tend 
to be linked to the ruling elite but individuals affiliated to leftist parties have also been 
successful.   As in the other case studies, Christian politicians are rarely seen as 
representing only ‘Christian issues’ and instead are active on wider political, 
economic and social matters.   However, this does not seem to elicit the resentment 
seen in Egypt which is perhaps indicative of the lack of communal violence in Jordan 
and the Palestinian Territories.   In contrast, Iraqi Christian politicians have become 
associated with voicing the concerns of the community to the government.   This 
aspect has been heightened by the accentuation of Assyrian ethnic identity as opposed 
to the Arab identity imposed under the Ba’th regime when the most prominent 
Christian political actor Tariq Aziz was perceived as first and foremost a Ba’thist with 
little interest in representing Christians.   Possibly as a reaction to this, several 
Christian political parties have been established including the Assyrian Democratic 
Movement and the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council (POGAR 2010).   
Therefore, depending on conditions within the state, the quota system can not only 
ensure that the community contributes to the selection of candidates but also provide 
them with the opportunity to represent key issues, thus heightening differences from 
the majority.  
   The last example of a quota system diverges from the above examples as the 
political system is based solely on quotas.  The Lebanese confessional system 
allocates parliamentary seats, cabinet members and government ministries according 
to the demographic composition of the country.   Originally based on the 1932 census, 
this arrangement was adjusted in the 1989 Taif Accord to allow parity between 
Muslims and Christians.   As this system applies to all Lebanese groups, the Christian 
communities are not treated differently from any other.   Indeed, it can be argued that 
Christians benefit from the confessional system as it is estimated that the largest 
Christian denomination – the Maronites – make up around 22% of the population 
(Faour 2007:917).   Unsurprisingly, Christians are generally strong supporters of 
maintaining this political system arguing that it is the best option for a highly divided 
society.   The issue of deconfessionalism has been raised by other actors during times 
of crisis but serious pressure to achieve this has not occurred despite its mention in the 
preamble to the constitution.   While Christians may enjoy substantial representation 
in political life, this has not prevented alienation of the communities from the elite.  
This is particularly true of the Maronites.   During the years of Syrian dominance after 
the Taif Accord, electoral discrimination was common against anti-Syrian opponents 
who were primarily though not solely Christian (McCallum 2010:106-110).   The 
individuals in prominent positions such as the presidency and cabinet were regarded 
as Syrian-approved appointments and were not seen as representative of the 
community.  This was in sharp contrast to the other two main communities who 
enjoyed either strong individual leadership e.g. the Sunni Rafiq al-Hariri or influential 
political organisations e.g. the Shia-dominated Amal and Hizb’allah groups.   The 
‘Cedar Revolution’ in 2005 allowed the two main Maronite leaders Michel Aoun and 
Samir Geagea to return from exile and prison respectively and re-enter politics.   Yet, 
they proved too divisive to challenge for the presidency in 2007-2008 leading to the 
eventual appointment of the former army commander Michel Sleiman.   Maronite 
discontent remains due to chronic instability and the perception that politicians remain 
more interested in personal gain than improving conditions for their constituents.  It is 
important to note that this is shared by members of other communities.   As well as 
being vulnerable to political manipulation, the Lebanese quota system also clearly 
accentuates religious identity as the basis of political representation which adversely 
affects national identity.   Lebanese politics since 2005 have been based on Sunni-
Shia divisions.   The presence of Christian politicians in both political factions (March 
14
th
 and March 8
th
) has arguably helped to reduce the danger of confessional conflict 
but has also demonstrated political disunity within the community.   In this example, 
Christians have been treated similarly as other groups through a quota system but this 
is directly linked to what can be termed Lebanese exceptionalism with regard to the 
make-up of the population and the ensuing political system. 
 
Conclusion 
In examining the nature and extent of Christian political participation in the Arab 
world, it is apparent that this cannot be analysed separately from the wider political 
situation in the region.   The prevalence of authoritarian regimes has meant that 
political participation has predominantly been defined by the ruling elite.  This refers 
to both the identity of the participants and the parameters of their activities.   The 
general disconnection between the state and its citizens has been experienced by 
Muslims and Christians alike.   Yet, while there is obvious discontent with approaches 
towards inclusion, Christians are also concerned at a change in the status quo which 
may increase the public role of Islam further at the expense of the political rights of 
non-Muslims.   Therefore, the impact of the 2011 Arab Spring is being watched 
warily by Christians (amongst others) in the region.   Recent efforts have been made 
to reconcile Islamic teachings with the demands of equality which are inherent in 
Christian understandings of involvement in national politics but it has proved 
considerably difficult to bridge these differences.   This is particularly true regarding 
the issue of non-Muslim rule over Muslims and the significance of Islam being 
recognised as the official state religion.   The continued existence of both written and 
de facto limitations on Christians gaining access to high political office serve as a 
constant reminder that the ‘equality’ espoused in constitutions, legislation and 
speeches on national unity usually comes with certain restrictions.   While the 
nationalism of the early and mid-twentieth centuries initially offered individual 
Christians an opportunity to participate as equal citizens, the failure of this ideological 
approach to negate religious identity in the political sphere meant that rhetoric may 
still talk of political equality but reality is rather more ambiguous.   The attention 
shown by various states to have visible examples of their inclusive nature through the 
formation of cabinets and legislatures has the potential to be perceived by Christians 
as demonstrating tolerance of their political participation rather than acknowledging 
their rights as citizens to have a stake in national affairs.    
   This paper has explored three strategies towards Christian political participation.   In 
all three, religious identity has proved crucial.   Officially, Christians in Syria are 
treated as indistinct from other Syrians as part of the secular nature of the Syrian state 
but in reality, the regime ensures that this sector of society is represented at all levels 
of the political sphere.   In Egypt, Christians are identified as ‘loyal’ citizens as part of 
a justification of their involvement in political and societal issues.   As they struggle 
to gain representation under existing rules, their political presence is boosted by 
presidential intervention.   Therefore, it would seem that attempts to avoid official 
acknowledgement that religious identity does affect the ability of Christians to play a 
full role in the political system merely lead to behind the scenes efforts to redress this 
imbalance.   The institutionalization of differences appears to be the most common 
strategy.   This approach has the advantage of securing representation and illustrating 
acceptance of the role of Christians.  However, it also places limitations on the 
amount of representation and overtly prioritises sub-state identities in determining the 
type of access that can be attained in the political sphere.   While such initiatives may 
be justified by states as benevolence towards a particular sector of society which 
would otherwise struggle to attain representation, they also have the potential to 
divide the population into different categories of citizenship.   By introducing 
different rules for citizens according to their identity, it can be argued that the Arab 
states erode the credibility of their claims of national unity where all citizens are 
equal.   Yet, there is also self-awareness amongst some Christian communities that 
this limited role may prove more inclusive than alternatives to existing regimes.  
Developments in Egypt after the fall of the Mubarak regime in early 2011 are being 
closely scrutinised by Christians both in Egypt and the wider region.   Naturally, there 
is strong interest in how the new government approaches the complex issue of 
Christian political participation.   Will they follow current policy, choose one of the 
other existing strategies or admittedly unlikely perhaps develop a more ambitious 
approach which directly tackles the question of full equality and citizenship for 
Christians?    
   In conclusion, the strategies outlined above demonstrate that religious identity 
remains a crucial component in determining how regimes deal with their Christian 
citizens.   Clearly, a glass ceiling exists in terms of Christian access to political power.   
The ability and desire of regimes to convince Christians that they are incorporated as 
equal rather than tolerated citizens appears connected to regime legitimacy.   The 
evidence suggests that regimes are unlikely to fully address this controversial issue 
given that it would necessitate the opening up of the debate on the public role of Islam 
and thus threaten regime stability.   Instead, Christians will be allocated a role in the 
political system – one which illustrates their presence but provides constraints to their 
influence, thus highlighting that religious difference still matters irrespective of the 
extent of national unity rhetoric.           
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